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Abstract We investigate the determinants of the support for cannabis legalization
finding a causal effect of personal experience with cannabis use. Current and past
cannabis users are more in favor of legalization. We relate this finding to self-interest
and inside information about potential dangers of cannabis. While the self-interest
effect is not very surprising, the effect of inside information suggests that cannabis
use is not as harmful as cannabis users originally thought it was before they started
consuming. Our analysis suggests that as the share of cannabis users in the population
increases, support for cannabis legalization will also increase.
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model · Factor approach
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1 Introduction
Inmany countries the production, use and distribution of cannabis are prohibited.How-
ever, the legal framework on cannabis is changing as some countries are becomingmore
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tolerant. The Netherlands quasi-legalized cannabis use through the introduction of
“coffeeshops” which are licensed cannabis sales outlets. Recently, four states in the
USA—Alaska, Colorado, Oregon and Washington—legalized cannabis for personal
use. A licensed retail and production system for cannabis was introduced in Uruguay
in 2014. There are several alternatives to prohibition varying from decriminaliza-
tion to regulation and legalization (European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug
Addiction 2013). Whereas decriminalization refers to the removal of the criminal
status for personal possession or use, regulation refers to limits on access and restric-
tions on advertizing. Legalization refers to cannabis use and cannabis supply, making
lawful what previously was prohibited. Although in the policy debate a distinction
is made between legalization and regulation of cannabis, we consider regulation as
legalization under restrictions and focus on the dichotomy between prohibition and
legalization.1
In the policy debate on cannabis legalization, there are frequent references to studies
which find that cannabis use has adverse effects on physical and mental health as well
as other negative effects on important life outcomes such as educational attainment
and labor market position (Ellickson et al. 1999; Brook et al. 1999; French et al.
2001; Arseneault et al. 2004; Van Ours 2006, 2007; Van Ours et al. 2013). There are
also frequent references to harm to society through crime and anti-social behavior
of users, the impacts on drug tourism and the gateway hypothesis.2 Nevertheless, in
their overview study on the effects of cannabis use, Van Ours and Williams (2015)
conclude that there do not appear to be serious harmful health effects of moderate
cannabis use but there is evidence of reduced mental well-being for heavy users who
are susceptible to mental health problems. Furthermore, they conclude that while
there is robust evidence that early cannabis use reduces educational attainment, there
remains substantial uncertainty as to whether using cannabis has adverse labor market
effects. Negative effects of cannabis use seem to be related to a small group of users
while for the majority of cannabis users these effects are absent.
It is well-known that cannabis users are more in favor of legalization than non-
users. A 1989 study from Norway shows that 65% of cannabis users were in favor
of prohibition of cannabis while among non-users this was 95% (Skretting 1993).
This study also finds that those who use cannabis do not consider drug possession as
a serious crime possibly because of self-interest.3 Trevino and Richard (2002) finds
that drug users in Houston have different attitudes toward drug policies than non-drug
users; 68% of drug users were in favor of legalizing cannabis, while only 33% of the
non-drug users were in favor. In the Netherlands, in 2008, among cannabis users only
1 What the optimal cannabis policy is from an economic point of view is not clear. Economic arguments are
based on the tradeoff between legalizing cannabis which would allow taxes to be introduced on cannabis
use or prohibiting cannabis use because it is easier to limit cannabis supply than to implement taxation. See
for studies that analyze the pros and cons of legalization (Becker et al. 2006; Caulkins et al. 2012; Glaeser
and Shleifer 2001; Miron and Zwiebel 1995).
2 The gateway hypothesis suggests cannabis use can be a gateway to hard drug use such as cocaine or
heroin.
3 The influence of self-interest is present also in the use of other (legal) drugs. Using Californian data,
Green and Gerken (1989) find that self-interest plays a decisive role in forming attitudes toward restrictions
on smoking and cigarette taxes.
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7% was in favor of prohibition of cannabis, while this was 50% among non-users
(Van der Sar et al. 2011). In Australia, in 1998, 57% of cannabis users were in favor
of legalizing cannabis while among the non-users this was only 18% (Williams et al.
2016).
All in all, several studies suggest that support for cannabis legalization is higher
among cannabis users. Interesting as this may be in itself, the fact that cannabis users
are more in favor of legalizing cannabis does not necessarily imply that opinions are
influenced by cannabis use in a causal way. It could be that individuals who are more
likely to consume cannabis are also more in favor of legalization without personal
experience affecting opinions. Knowing whether or not there is a causal effect from
cannabis use to opinions is interesting because if there is a causal effect, this reveals
how potential dangers of cannabis use are assessed. Cannabis users may change their
mind about cannabis legalization through personal experience. As Orphanides and
Zervos (1995) point out there is uncertainty about whether or not individuals might
get addicted if they start using drugs. Individuals may start using cannabis by way
of experimenting balancing the instant pleasure it provides and probabilistic future
harm. Consumption of cannabis is not equally harmful to all. Some may not be sus-
ceptible to addiction while others are of the addictive type. Individuals do not know
their addictive tendency and the only way to find out is by experimentation. How-
ever, if individuals of the addictive type experiment and recognize their tendency too
late they are drawn into addiction. If individuals believe that their risk of addiction
is high they may optimally choose not to experiment with cannabis. Once individ-
uals experiment with cannabis they may conclude that they are not of the addictive
type and for them there is no harm. In other words, by using cannabis individuals
learn about potential harmful effects and therefore they may change their mind about
legalization.
We argue that if cannabis use has a favorable effect on opinions about cannabis
legalization, then this may reveal that cannabis use is not as harmful as what it is
originally believed.However, such a causal effectmayalsohave todowith self-interest,
i.e. cannabis legalization leading to easier access to cannabis and perhaps lower prices.
We argue that it is possible to make a distinction between inside information and self-
interest by comparing how past cannabis use and current cannabis use affect opinions.
Whereas the effect of current cannabis use may be a mixture of self-interest and
inside information, the effect of past cannabis use is related to inside information
only. Although previous studies clearly show that there is a significant difference
between cannabis users and non-users in the opinions about cannabis policies, they
do not establish whether this has to do with a causal relationship. The only study that
establishes a causal relationship between user status and opinions on cannabis policy
is Williams et al. (2016). They analyze Australian data from cross-sectional surveys
over the period 1993–2007 using a quasi-panel approach to account for potential
endogeneity of cannabis use. The main conclusion is that preference of past users
for legalization is consistent with information on net benefits of cannabis use while
self-interest as contributing to current users’ support for legalization cannot be ruled
out. Although focusing on a similar research question, our study differs from theirs in
terms of econometric specification and identification strategy.
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In the empirical part of our analysis, we use a statistical model that allows us to
establish the causal effects of cannabis use on opinions about cannabis policies. We
focus on two policy statements in a survey conducted in the Netherlands in 2008.
Individuals were asked to indicate their support for statements on prohibition and
legalization of cannabis. We estimate simultaneous models that integrate cannabis use
dynamics and opinions on cannabis use.4 Wefind that cannabis user status is correlated
with opinions on cannabis legalization. This correlation partly reflects a causal effect.
Current cannabis users and past cannabis users seem to have learned from their experi-
ences and are thereforemore in favor of legalizing cannabis. Current cannabis users are
more in favor of legalizing cannabis than past cannabis users. This suggests that self-
interest plays a role in opinions about cannabis policies but more interestingly, it also
suggests that cannabis use may not be as harmful as non-users are inclined to think.5
Our contribution to the literature on the economics of cannabis use is threefold. First,
we present an analysis of opinions on cannabis policies in a quasi-legal environment.
TheDutch respondents have little incentive tomisreport as there is nothing illegal about
using cannabis. Because of the quasi-legal environment, they are also familiar with
potential consequences of making cannabis easily available. Second, we establish a
causal link from cannabis use to opinions on cannabis policy. Third, we present a novel
strategy to investigate the assessment of potential harmful effects by distinguishing
between self-interest and inside information. Since several aspects of cannabis use
feed into opinions on cannabis policies, these harmful effects are not only related to
the individuals themselves but also to the society in general.
The setup of our paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 we give a brief overview of cannabis
policy in the Netherlands. In Sect. 3 we discuss our data and give some stylized facts.
Section 4 presents our empiricalmodel and in Sect. 5wediscuss our baseline parameter
estimates together with estimates from several sensitivity and falsification/placebo
analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Cannabis policy in The Netherlands
As indicated in the introduction, in the Netherlands, cannabis use is quasi-legalized.
Small quantities of cannabis can be bought in cannabis shops. These are retail outlets
and referred to as “coffeeshops”. Cannabis policy is focused on health issues (DeGraaf
et al. 2010) and can be summarized as tolerant (VanSolinge 1999). The basic aimof the
cannabis policy is to lessen the potential harm to users and their environment. Although
4 In the context of a MPH model describing the dynamics in cannabis, correlated models have been used
for example by Van Ours and Williams (2012) and Van Ours and Williams (2011) to study the relationship
between cannabis use and health and by Van Ours (2007) to study wage effects of cannabis use. Cannabis
use is not the only context in which such methods are used. In labor economics literature, Abbring et al.
(2005), Arni et al. (2013) andVanOurs (2004) for example, use similar methods. Other examples are Fevang
et al. (2014) who analyze Norwegian absenteeism jointly modeling the flow from presence to absence and
back and Richardson and van den Berg (2013) who study the effect of labor market training on the job
finding rates of Swedish unemployed workers.
5 Note that the expectation about the effect of past use on opinions is not very clear. It can be also the case
that past users face the negative effects of cannabis use and regret the fact that they have used cannabis. Our
empirical findings suggests that there is no regret.
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cannabis is tolerated by Dutch authorities, use of hard drugs and production and trade
of soft drugs and hard drugs are classified as serious offenses (Palali and van Ours
2015). The distinction between soft and hard drugs in terms of legal measures is at the
heart of drug policy. The intention is to provide an organized environment for cannabis
sale, thus keeping potential customers away from dealers of more harmful illicit drugs
and having a control over the quality of cannabis. Coffeeshops are regulated by law.
Some of the fundamental rules are: no sale of hard drugs, no advertising, no sale to
youngsters below 18years of age, no nuisance and no more than 500g of cannabis on
the premises. Failures to operate within the regulations might result in shutting down
of the shop. The duration of shut down depends on the seriousness of the violations
committed by the owners of coffeeshops.
The 1980s stand as a crucial period in the history of Dutch cannabis policies.
In 1980, the policy of tolerance of coffeeshops was publicly announced by Dutch
authorities and this announcement was followed by a sharp increase in the number
of coffeeshops (Jansen 1991). In the mid 1990s there were around 1500 coffeeshops.
However, in the 1990s the tolerant cannabis policy was increasingly criticized from
inside the country aswell as fromother countries. In 1995, theDutch governmentmade
changes in the rules under which coffeeshops could operate. From 1996 onwards the
limit for personal possession of cannabis was decreased from 30 to 5g. Moreover, the
monitoring and punishment of production and trade of cannabis were increased and
more importantly, local governments were given the opportunity to decide whether or
not they wanted to have a cannabis-shop in their municipality. These policies caused
a substantial decrease in the number of coffeeshops (Bieleman et al. 2007). In 1999,
there were 846 coffeeshops across the Netherlands, a number that went down to 651
in 2011 and further down to 582 in 2015.
3 Data and stylized facts
3.1 Data
Our data are from the 2008 Alcohol and Drugs study, one of the assembled studies of
theDutchLongitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) panel. TheLISS
survey is administered by CentERdata, a research institute of Tilburg University. The
data used in our study are from one of the special cross-sectional surveys conducted
in November 2008. The online survey is addressed to a representative Dutch sample.
Respondents answered various questions about their opinions on different types of
government policies on cannabis. Furthermore, respondents were asked whether they
had ever used cannabis and if they answered affirmatively they were faced with the
question: At what age, approximately, did you first use cannabis? Individuals were
also asked to report if they were currently using cannabis, i.e. whether they had used
cannabis in the previous 30 days. Because older individuals were never confronted
with cannabis supply, we perform our analysis on individuals who were born in 1960
or later. It appears that about 20% of the respondents ever used cannabis whereas less
than 5% used cannabis in the previous 30days. The latter are considered to be current
users whereas the others are considered to be past users.
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Fig. 1 Starting rates and cumulative starting probabilities cannabis use. a Starting rates (% per year).
b Cumulative starting probabilities (%)
We use information on past cannabis use and current cannabis use, together with
the retrospective question on the age of first cannabis use to analyze cannabis use
dynamics. Figure 1 shows the dynamics in cannabis use. Panel a shows that the starting
rate for cannabis use has a peak at age 17. The probability to use cannabis for the first
time is at its highest point at age of 17. There are other smaller peaks at age 19 and
21. After age 25 the probability of using cannabis conditional on not using before
virtually becomes zero. Panel b confirms this finding by showing that the slope of the
line representing the cumulative probability of using cannabis becomes very small
after age 25.
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3.2 Stylized facts
In themain part of our empirical analysis, we focus on two statements. The respondents
were asked to indicate their opinion on a scale from 1 to 5 ranging from definitely dis-
agree to definitely agree with the following statement: cannabis should be prohibited.
We rescaled the responses given to this statement assuming that those who indicated
to agree with it would disagree with the statement that cannabis should be legalized
and vice versa. The respondents were also asked to report their opinion on the state-
ment coffeeshops should be allowed to sell cannabis. We assume that this statement
on coffeeshops is equivalent to a statement on the current status of cannabis policy in
the Netherlands. Panels a and b of Table 1 present the distribution of opinions for the
full sample and subsamples distinguished by user status. On average, the responses
are evenly distributed; 45% of the sample agree that cannabis should be legalized
whereas another 34% state that they disagree. The remaining 21% is indifferent. Sim-
ilarly, 46% of the individuals state that they agree with the idea of selling cannabis
through coffeeshops whereas 35% disagree.6
Dividing the sample into three categories based on user status exhibits interest-
ing results. Among current cannabis users only 1definitely disagree and 2 legalized
whereas 89 percent agrees. Similarly 85% of the current users of cannabis agree with
the statement that coffeeshops should be allowed to sell cannabis. These percent-
ages are different for past users of cannabis of whom 77% disagree with prohibition
whereas 9% agree with this idea. Similarly 74% of the past cannabis users agree
with the statement that coffeeshops should be allowed sell cannabis. The numbers are
reversed for those who have never used cannabis in their lives. Almost half of the
never users state that they disagree with the idea of legalization whereas only 31% of
the never users agree. Among the never users only 32% agree with coffeeshops while
45% of these respondents disagree.
The last column in Table 1 presents the p values of a Chi-square test where we test
if the differences between reported percentages among current, past and never users
are statistically significant as compared to never users, never users and ever users
respectively. For most of the policy statements, which will be discussed in more detail
below, the raw data indicate that there are significant differences in opinions about
cannabis policies depending on the user status.
Table 2 provides a description and summary statistics of the variables used in our
analysis. Most of the descriptions are self-explanatory. For the question on political
preferences we grouped the various parties in the Netherlands as follows: Con-
servatives (VVD, Trots op Nederland, PVV), Left wing (PvdA, SP, Groen-Links,
D66, Partij van de Dieren), Center (CDA, Christenunie, SGP), Others (other party,
would rather not say, would not vote, is not entitled to vote, blank vote, does not
know).
6 If no birth year restriction is imposed on the sample, these figures are 39 and 43%, respectively. In 1998
this distribution was very much the same: Back then, 43% of the Dutch population of 19years and older
thought that coffeeshopswere admissible while 46% thought theywere not admissible (Sociaal en Cultureel
Planbureau 1998).
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Table 1 Opinions on various types of cannabis policy (percentages)
Definitely Definitely
Disagree Disagree Indifferent Agree Agree Total N P valuea
a. Cannabis legalized
1 All 16 18 21 28 17 100 2016
2 Current users 0 2 8 33 56 100 96 0.00
3 Past users 4 5 14 43 34 100 529 0.00
4 Never users 21 24 24 22 9 100 1391 0.00
b. Coffeeshops permitted
1 All 19 16 19 36 10 100 2015
2 Current users 3 5 7 45 40 100 95 0.00
3 Past users 6 7 13 57 17 100 529 0.00
4 Never users 25 20 22 27 5 100 1391 0.00
c. No sale to youngsters
1 All 1 3 12 50 34 100 2015
2 Current users 3 7 15 50 26 100 95 0.01
3 Past users 1 4 11 53 31 100 529 0.04
4 Never users 1 2 12 50 36 100 1391 0.00
d. No coffeeshops near schools
1 All 2 4 11 39 44 100 2014
2 Current users 5 11 27 33 24 100 95 0.00
3 Past users 2 5 15 47 31 100 528 0.00
4 Never users 2 3 8 36 50 100 1391 0.00
e. Education campaigns
1 All 0 1 6 52 40 100 2012
2 Current users 0 1 10 52 36 100 95 0.00
3 Past users 0 1 6 57 35 100 528 0.00
4 Never users 0 1 6 50 42 100 1389 0.00
f. Drugs education at schools
1 All 1 1 8 53 36 100 2005
2 Current users 2 5 14 50 29 100 95 0.49
3 Past users 0 2 9 58 30 100 528 0.03
4 Never users 1 1 7 2 39 100 1382 0.02
a The p value of a Chi-square test of independence with null hypothesis that the reported difference in
opinion categories between current and never users, past and never users, and ever (current or past) and
never users is not significant. For most of the cases we reject this null hypothesis
4 Empirical model
4.1 Cannabis use dynamics
In the analysis of cannabis use starting rates, we assume that individuals become
vulnerable to the risk of cannabis use from age 13 onwards. This is because only a
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Table 2 Description and summary statistics of the variables
Variable Definition Mean Min. Max.
Female 1 if the respondent is female 0.57 0 1
Religion Amount of the times that the parents of the respondent
visited a church per week when the respondent was 15
1.72 0 6
Migrant 1 if the respondent is migrant 0.14 0 1
Urban 1 1 if the resident is in an extremely urban area 0.13 0 1
Urban 2 1 if the resident is in a very or moderately urban area 0.49 0 1
Urban 3 1 if the resident is in an slightly urban area 0.22 0 1
Urban 4 (Reference) 1 if the resident is in a not urban area 0.16 0 1
Primary (Reference) 1 if the respondent has primary ed. 0.05 0 1
Secondary 1 1 if the respondent has intermediate secondary ed. 0.19 0 1
Secondary 2 1 if the respondent has high secondary ed. 0.15 0 1
Vocational 1 1 if the respondent has intermediate vocational ed. 0.30 0 1
Vocational 2 1 if the respondent has high vocational ed. 0.24 0 1
University 1 if the respondent has university ed. 0.08 0 1
Ever use 1 if the respondent ever used cannabis 0.31 0 1
Past use 1 if the respondent ever used cannabis but not in the last
30 days
0.26 0 1
Current use 1 if the respondent used cannabis in the last 30 days 0.05 0 1
Intensity of use: 1 if the respondent used cannabis in following intensity:
6–7days a week
0.01 0 1
2–5days a week 0.02 0 1
1day a week 0.01 0 1
<1day a week 0.01 0 1
Starting age Starting age of cannabis (conditional on ever use) 18.1 13 60
Single w/o child (Reference) 1 if the respondent is single with no children 0.13 0 1
Couple w/o child 1 if the respondent is in a couple without children 0.20 0 1
Couple w child 1 if the respondent is in a couple with children 0.60 0 1
Single w child 1 if the respondent is single with children 0.06 0 1
Other 1 if otherwise 0.01 0 1
Age 15–24 (Reference) 1 if the respondent is 15–24years old 0.16 0 1
Age 25–34 1 if the respondent is 25–34years old 0.27 0 1
Age 35–44 1 if the respondent is 35–44years old 0.40 0 1
Age 45+ 1 if the respondent is more than 45years old 0.17 0 1
Conservative (Reference) 1 if the respondent is categorized as a
conservative voter
0.18 0 1
Left wing 1 if the respondent is categorized as left wing voter 0.27 0 1
Center 1 if the respondent is categorized as center voter 0.14 0 1
Others 1 if the respondent is categorized as other 0.10 0 1
I don’t know 1 if the respondent did not want to disclose his/her
preference
0.28 0 1
Policy opinion 1 Cannabis should be legalized 2.91 1 5
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Table 2 continued
Variable Definition Mean Min. Max.
Policy opinion 2 It should be permitted to sell cannabis at coffeeshops 2.81 1 5
Policy opinion 2 Government should ensure that coffeeshops don’t sell
cannabis to people below 18years old
4.29 1 5
Policy opinion 4 Coffeeshops should not be in the vicinity of schools 4.28 1 5
Policy opinion 5 Government should conduct drug education campaigns 4.30 1 5
Policy opinion 6 Government should ensure that schools provide drug
education campaign
4.34 1 5
Policy opinion variables (1–6): Respondents are asked to give their opinion about the corresponding state-
ment. 1 means definitely disagree while 5 means definitely agree. The number of observations is 2016
few individuals start using cannabis before the age of 13. We specify the starting rate
for cannabis use at time t (t = 0 at age 12) conditional on observed characteristics x
and unobserved characteristics u as
θc(t | x, u) = λc(t) exp(x ′βc + u) (1)
where βc represent the effects of independent variables and λc(t) represents individual
duration (age) dependence. Unobserved heterogeneity, in this case, is denoted with u
which controls for differences in individuals’ unobserved susceptibility to cannabis
use. We model duration (age) dependence in a flexible way by using a step function
λc(t) = exp(Σkλk Ik(t)), where k(= 1, . . . , 9) is a subscript for age categories and
Ik(t) are time-varying dummy variables that are one in subsequent categories, 8 of
which are for individual ages (age 13, . . . , 20) and the last interval is for ages above
20years. Because we also estimate a constant term, we normalize λc,1 = 0.
The conditional density function of the completed durations until the uptake of
cannabis use can be written as
fc(t | x, u) = θc(t | x, u) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
θc(s | x, u)ds
)
(2)
We integrate out the unobserved heterogeneity such that density function for the dura-
tion of time until cannabis uptake t conditional on x is
fc(t | x) =
∫
u
fc(t | x, u)dG(u) (3)
where G(u) is assumed to be a discrete mixing distribution with 2 points of support
ua and ub reflecting the presence of two types of individuals in the hazard rate for
cannabis uptake. The associated probabilities are denoted as follows: Pr(u = ua) = r
and Pr(u = ub + ua) = 1 − r with 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, and r is modeled using a logit
specification, r = exp(α)1+exp(α) .
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To account for the discrete nature of the observations of age of onset of cannabis
use, the log-likelihood is specified as
n∑
i=1
dc,i log [Fc(ti − 1) − Fc(ti )] +
(
1 − dc,i
)
log
[
1 − Fc(ts,i )
]
(4)
where i is an index for individual, n is the number of individuals in the sample and dc,i
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if an individual started using cannabis and equal
to 0 if an individual did not start using cannabis before being interviewed at age ts .
In addition to starting rates of cannabis use, we also estimate quitting rates in
order to have a complete analysis of cannabis use dynamics. The LISS panel includes
questions on the last month use of cannabis. We assume that if the individual reports
no use of cannabis in the last 30days, that individual stopped using cannabis in time
period starting from the first use of cannabis until 30days prior to the survey. The
conditional density function for the completed durations until the last use of cannabis
can be written as
fq(τ | x1, v) = θq(x1, v) exp(−θq(x1, v) · τ) (5)
Even thoughwedonot observe the exact timeof quitting in terms of age of respondents,
we can still analyze the duration of quitting thanks to the interval censored nature of
the data. However, note that due to the uncertainty about the exact time of quitting,
duration dependence is not estimated here. On the other hand it is certain that the
duration of cannabis use, τ , will lie in the interval [0, τq ] where τq is the difference
between age at the time of survey and the age of the first use. This means that we
can integrate out the conditional density function over this period to account for the
uncertainty of quitting time and obtain the distribution function, Fq . Individuals who
report using cannabis in the last 30days are assumed to be right censored in their
quitting, i.e. as yet they did not quit. Since the quitting analysis is performed only on
those who ever used cannabis there are no left censored individuals. As in the analysis
of the uptake of cannabis, we assume that there are 2 unobserved heterogeneity groups
where the probabilities are assumed to follow a logistic distribution. The log-likelihood
is specified as
m∑
i=1
dq,i log
[
Fq(τq,i )
] + (1 − dq,i ) log [1 − Fq(τq,i )] (6)
where m is the number of individuals that ever used cannabis and dq,i is a dummy
variable which has a value of 1 if the individual stopped using cannabis and a value
of 0 if the individual did not stop using cannabis.
Finally, we allow for the possibility that conditional on the observed characteristics,
the age of uptake and the duration of use cannabis uptake and cannabis quits are cor-
related through unobserved characteristics. The joint density of completed durations
until the uptake of cannabis use and completed durations of cannabis use is specified as:
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g1(t, τ | x1, x2) =
∫
v
∫
u
fc(t | x1, v) fq(τ | x2, u)dG(u, v) (7)
where G(u, v) is the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity which assume to
be discrete with an unknown number of support points.
4.2 Opinions on cannabis policy
We first model the determinants of opinions on cannabis policy assuming that the
dynamics in cannabis use are exogenous. Then we take possible correlation between
the two processes into account. Individuals report their opinions on the relevant
cannabis policy statements on a scale of 1–5, with 1 representing definitely disagree
and 5 representing definitely agree. In order to exploit this ordinal character of the
dependent variable, we use an ordered probit model with Heckman and Singer type
discrete unobserved heterogeneity (Heckman and Singer 1984). The unobserved latent
variable in the ordered response model is defined as
y∗ = x ′2βp + ρccc + ρpcp + 	 + e (8)
where cc represent current cannabis use, cp represents past cannabis use and 	 con-
trols for discrete type of unobserved heterogeneity which is different from the error
term e that represents the random error term. The parameters of interest in our study
are ρc and ρp which measure the effect of current and past use of cannabis on the
opinions about cannabis policy statements. Furthermore, βp measures the effect of
our control variables whose descriptions and summary statistics are provided in detail
in Table 2. The observed responses on the cannabis policy statements in the data are,
then, assumed to be
y =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 (Definitely disagree) if y∗ ≤ μ1
2 (Disagree) if μ1 < y∗ ≤ μ2
3 (Indifferent) if μ2 < y∗ ≤ μ3
4 (Agree) if μ3 < y∗ ≤ μ4
5 (Definitely agree) if μ4 < y∗
(9)
where μ’s are to be estimated threshold parameters in the ordered choice models.
Assuming that the error term e has a standard normal distribution, we can write the
following probabilities for the ordered probit model conditional on observable and
unobservable individual heterogeneity7:
Pr(y = 1|x3, 	) = Φ(μ1 − x ′3βp − 	)
Pr(y = 2|x3, 	) = Φ(μ2 − x ′3βp − 	) − Φ(μ1 − x ′3βp − 	)
.
Pr(y = 5|x3, 	) = 1 − Φ(μ4 − x ′3βp − 	)
. (10)
7 For simplicity we write x ′3βp = x ′2βp + ρccc + ρpcp .
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whereΦ(.) is standard normal cdf. Unconditional probabilities, then, can bewritten as
Pr(y = j |x3) =
∫
	
Prob(y = j |x3, 	)dG(	) (11)
where j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, denoting ordered responses. G(	) is assumed to be a dis-
crete mixing distribution with 2 points of support 	a and 	b indicating that conditional
on observed characteristics there are 2 types of individuals in the ordered responses
given to the policy statements. The associated probabilities are denoted as follows:
Pr(	 = 	a) = p and Pr(	 = 	b + 	a) = 1 − p with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, where p is modeled
using a logit specification, p = exp(α)1+exp(α) .
There are a number of assumptions and normalizations which need to be made
for model identification. First, we assume that mean and variance of the error term e
in the latent equation are 0 and 1, respectively. Since we have heterogeneity specific
constants in the model, we also set the first threshold parameter μ1 to zero. The
other threshold parameters are modeled in the following way in order to ensure that
probabilities are positive and thresholds are ordered: μ2 = γ 21 , μ3 = μ2 + γ 22 and
μ4 = μ3 + γ 23 . Finally, we write the likelihood function of the ordered choice model
as
∏
N Prob(y = j |x3).
Until now, when estimating the ordered probit model for opinions, we assume
that the decision to use cannabis is exogenous, i.e. independent from any factor that
would affect the opinions about cannabis policies. However, it is possible that there
are unobserved personal characteristics that affect both the decision to use cannabis
and opinions about cannabis policies. If, for example, certain individuals have an
inclination toward cannabis use due to some intrinsic factors that would also lead
them to have positive attitudes toward liberal cannabis policies, then we might end
up with significant parameter estimates for ρc and ρp even though there is no causal
relationship. In order to control for correlation between unobserved characteristics and
establish a causal effect, we jointly estimate the ordered probit model and the mixed
proportional hazard models following a discrete factor approach. The joint density
function of the completed duration of uptake of cannabis, the duration of cannabis use
and opinions on cannabis use is specified as:
g2(t, τ, y = j | x1, x2, x3) =
∫
	
∫
v
∫
u
fc(t | x1, v) fq(τ | x2, u)Prob(y = j | x3, 	)
dG(v,w, 	) (12)
where G(v,w, 	) is a discrete mixing distribution underlying unobserved heterogene-
ity affecting age of onset of cannabis use, duration of use and opinions about cannabis
policies. This approach is introduced by Heckman and Singer (1984) in order to con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity in hazard rates and used for example byMroz (1999)
to estimate the effects of dummy endogenous variables. The approach is equivalent
to a correlated random effects model in which the main idea is that unobserved het-
erogeneity affecting opinions about cannabis policies and unobserved heterogeneity
affecting cannabis use dynamics can be correlated, i.e. they come from a joint mixing
distribution. The assumption on support points of this joint distribution defines the
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types of individuals regarding opinions and cannabis use. If, for example, conditional
on observed characteristics there are two types of individuals in terms of uptake of
cannabis and two types in terms of quitting cannabis, then there could be four types
of individuals in terms of cannabis dynamics. If in addition to this conditional on
unobserved characteristics there are two types of individuals in terms of opinions on
cannabis policy, then there could be eight types of individuals in terms of cannabis
dynamics and opinions on cannabis policy. However, it could also be that there are
only two types of individuals in terms of cannabis dynamics: Individuals who are
inclined to used cannabis and individuals who will never start using cannabis. If this is
the case, then there could be four types of individuals: those who are more in favor of
cannabis policies and more likely to use drugs, those who are less in favor of cannabis
policies and more likely to use drugs, those who are more in favor of liberal drug
policies and more likely to abstain from drugs, and those who are against liberal drug
policies and more likely to abstain from drugs. Finally, if there is a perfect correla-
tion between unobserved heterogeneity behind cannabis use dynamics and opinions,
only the first and the last types are identified. An important advantage of using the
functional form assumptions behind this approach is that identification is achieved
without relying on exclusion restrictions which can be very challenging to find
because cannabis use is likely to have the same determinants as opinions on cannabis
policy.
5 Parameter estimates
5.1 Cannabis use dynamics
The parameter estimates of the various models are obtained through the method of
maximum likelihood. The parameter estimates of the mixed proportional hazard mod-
els describing starting rates and quitting rates of cannabis use are presented in Table 3.
The first column presents the results for the starting rates. The parameter estimate
for female is found to be negative and significant. Thus, as in previous studies we
find that on average females start using cannabis at a later age. Religiosity of the
parents during the childhood of respondents is found to be significantly negative.
So, as the parents are more religious, the age of initiation to cannabis use increases.
Migrant status of the individual is found to be insignificant. Moreover, the degree of
urbanization of the municipality has a significant effect on the uptake of cannabis
indicating that individuals residing in highly urban areas start using cannabis at ear-
lier ages. The most likely reasons are that cannabis happens to be more available
and living styles of individuals might make them more vulnerable to the risk of
cannabis use in highly urban regions. Educational attainment does not seem to affect
the uptake of cannabis.8 Finally, there is a clear cohort effect since age at the time of
the survey is an important determinant of cannabis uptake. Older cohorts were less
likely to start using cannabis. In line with Fig. 1, age dependency parameters indicate
8 We assume that educational attainment represents ability since many individuals start using cannabis
before finishing school.
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Table 3 Dynamics in cannabis
use: parameter estimates of
mixed proportional hazard
models on starting age and
quitting age of cannabis use
Based on 2016 observations,
likelihood ratio test 1 indicates
that unobserved heterogeneity is
not significant in the quitting
rates. Note that d.o.f of the test is
2 since when ub = 0, α is not
identified in the quitting rates
estimation
Likelihood ratio test 2 compares
the independent models against
the correlated model and shows
that we cannot reject that the two
processes are independent;
absolute t-statistics in
parentheses
* and ** are for statistical
significance at 10 and 5%,
respectively
Bivariate
Starting rates Quitting rates
(1) (2)
Female −0.68 (5.0)** 0.33 (2.6)**
Religion −0.22 (5.2)** 0.00 (0.1)
Migrant −0.27 (1.3) 0.06 (0.3)
Urban 1 0.92 (3.8)** −0.76 (3.2)**
Urban 2 0.21 (1.0) −0.38 (1.8)*
Urban 3 0.28 (1.2) −0.41 (1.8)*
Secondary 1 −0.03 (0.1) 0.46 (1.7)*
Secondary 2 0.08 (0.2) 1.14 (3.6)**
Vocational 1 −0.37 (1.1) 0.62 (2.4)**
Vocational 2 0.15 (0.5) 1.00 (3.6)**
University 0.31 (0.8) 1.06 (3.4)**
Age 25–34 −0.11 (0.6) −0.36 (1.7)*
Age 35–44 −1.27 (6.1)** −0.89 (4.5)**
Age 45+ −2.05 (7.3)** −0.85 (2.4)**
Age of onset 0.76 (5.6)**
Age dependence
Age dep. 21+ 1.39 (3.7)**
Age dep. 20 2.98 (8.2)**
Age dep. 19 2.50 (6.6)**
Age dep. 18 3.26 (9.7)**
Age dep. 17 2.72 (8.3)**
Age dep. 16 2.89 (9.9)**
Age dep. 15 1.86 (6.4)**
Age dep. 14 0.94 (3.0)**
Unobserved heterogeneity
ua −2.49 (5.3)** −3.11 (7.9)**
ub −5.95 (14.1)** –
α −1.25 (8.5)** –
-Loglikelihood 2921.6
LR test 1 4.6
LR test 2 0.4
that there is a peak in the uptake of cannabis at age 17 and another peak at age 19.
The mass point estimates of column 1 show that unobserved heterogeneity is indeed
significant in the data at hand. The estimate of −1.25 for α implies that 22% of the
respondents have a high starting rate of cannabis use whereas 78% of them have a
substantially lower starting rate.
Column 2 of Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for quitting rates. We find
that females are not only more likely to start using cannabis at later ages but they
are also more likely to quit early. The parameter estimate for the first urbanization
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category is negative and significant, indicating that those who live in highly urban
areas quit using cannabis later. Lower educated individuals have a smaller quit rate
and individuals from the older birth cohorts have a smaller quit rate as well. Finally,
we find that those who start using cannabis at a later age quit earlier, i.e. early starters
quit late. Conditional on the observed characteristics we do not find evidence of the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the quit rate. If we estimate a joint model
of cannabis starting and cannabis quitting, we find that there is correlation between
the two processes through unobserved heterogeneity. However, the second LR test
reported at the bottom of the table compares the independent models of cannabis
uptake and cannabis quits against the correlated model. As shown, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the two processes are independent.
5.2 Opinions on cannabis use: baseline parameter estimates
Table 4 presents our baseline parameter estimates for the first policy statement that
cannabis should be legalized. The results for the univariate ordered probit model are
shown in the first column. We find no evidence of unobserved heterogeneity having a
significant effect. The parameter estimates of both past use and current use of cannabis
are positive and significant indicating that both self-interest and information may have
an effect on opinions. However, the estimates in the first column are based on the
assumption that the decision to use cannabis is exogenous to the opinions regarding
cannabis policies.
The correlated models whose parameter estimates are presented in the second col-
umn of Table 4 are obtained after controlling for possible endogeneity. Now, we are
able to identify two mass-points in the ordered probit for opinions indicating that
once we take correlation with cannabis use dynamics in account there is unobserved
heterogeneity affecting opinions.9 Clearly, the parameter estimates of cannabis use
status become smaller in absolute terms indicating that part of the effects found in the
univariate model are due to the correlated unobserved heterogeneity. The remaining
effect may be interpreted as causal. The second LR test shows that past and current
cannabis use have significant effects on opinion on cannabis legalization while the
third LR test shows that the effect of past cannabis use is significantly smaller than the
effect of current cannabis use. The opinions of current cannabis users are expected to
be affected by both self-interest and information. The opinions of past cannabis users
are not affected by self-interest. Parameter estimates reflect only the effect of infor-
mation about cannabis use. The results obtained for past users indicate that cannabis
may not be as harmful as individuals originally thought or as non-users are inclined
to think. This may be specific to countries like the Netherlands where cannabis use is
legalized or quasi-legalized.10
9 The first likelihood ratio test statistic has a value of 6.6 which is significant with 1 degree of freedom
(	b).
10 In countries where cannabis use is illegal, past users can still be affected by self-interest because the
reason they do not use cannabis today can be illegality itself. In other words, they might have quit using
cannabis because of the opportunity cost of being arrested. In such as case, they can still have a self-
interest in supporting liberal policies, as they think liberal policies would remove the possible future costs
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Table 4 Parameter estimates of
the effect of past and current use
of cannabis on the cannabis
policy statement: Cannabis
should be legalized
Based on 2016 observations; LR
test 1 tests the univariate model
against the correlated model.
Likelihood Ratio test 2 is for the
joint significance of cannabis
use variables. LR test 3 is for
equality of the parameters of
past cannabis use and current
cannabis use. Absolute
t-statistics in parentheses
* and ** are for statistical
significance at 10 and 5%,
respectively
Univariate Correlated
(1) (2)
Past cannabis use 0.97 (16.0)** 0.71 (5.7)**
Current cannabis use 1.60 (10.5)** 1.35 (7.8)**
Female 0.01 (0.2) −0.03 (0.6)
Religion −0.05 (3.1)** −0.05 (3.6)**
Migrant −0.07 (1.0) −0.11 (1.6)
Urban 1 −0.12 (1.2) −0.07 (0.7)
Urban 2 −0.09 (1.2) −0.08 (1.0)
Urban 3 −0.12 (1.4) −0.10 (1.1)
Secondary 1 0.04 (0.1) −0.03 (0.2)
Secondary 2 0.30 (2.2)** 0.26 (2.1)**
Vocational 1 0.21 (1.6) 0.13 (1.2)
Vocational 2 0.41 (3.1)** 0.37 (3.2)**
University 0.56 (3.7)** 0.53 (3.8)**
Couple without child −0.03 (0.5) −0.05 (0.5)
Couple with child −0.27 (3.7)** −0.28 (3.7)**
Single with child −0.06 (0.6) −0.09 (0.7)
Other −0.33 (1.3) −0.39 (1.5)
Age 25–34 −0.06 (0.7) −0.09 (1.4)
Age 35–44 −0.24 (2.9)** −0.29 (3.6)**
Age 45+ −0.20 (2.1)** −0.25 (2.7)**
Left wing 0.28 (3.8)** 0.26 (3.8)**
Center −0.31 (3.4)** −0.29 (3.5)**
Others −0.20 (2.0)** −0.18 (2.0)**
I don’t know 0.01 (0.2) 0.00 (0.0)
	a 1.50 (7.3)** 0.73 (3.0)**
	b 0.43 (2.3)**
α −1.26 (8.7)**
γ1 1.01 (52.7)** 1.02 (50.8)**
μ2 [1.1] [1.0]
γ2 0.82 (44.4)** 0.81 (44.1)**
μ3 [1.8] [1.7]
γ3 0.81 (41.2)** 0.82 (41.6)**
μ4 [2.5] [2.4]
-Loglikelihood 5783.2 5779.9
LR test 1 6.6 **
LR test 2 50.1 **
LR test 3 24.8 **
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Since the parameter estimate for current users is larger in absolute terms than the
parameter estimate for past users there is also evidence of self-interest influencing
opinions. Indeed likelihood ratio test 3 in Table 4 shows that we strongly reject the
hypothesis that current and past use of cannabis have the same effect on opinions.
Current cannabis use has a substantial bigger effect on opinions than past cannabis
use. In an unreported estimation (see for details Palali and vanOurs 2014), we also find
that the frequency of current cannabis use matters. More frequent the cannabis use,
i.e. more self-interest leads to a more favorable opinion about cannabis legalization.
Casual users do not differ from past users. For individuals who rarely use cannabis,
inside information is driving the results rather than self-interest, which is consistent
with our interpretations of the results. This is particularly important because several
studies, for example Caulkins and Pacula (2006) and Kilmer et al. (2014), find that
even though they constitute a small group heavy users account for most of the cannabis
transactions.
5.3 Robustness checks
5.3.1 Sensitivity to policy statements
Table 5 presents the results of a sensitivity analysis focusing on other statements on
cannabis policy or drug policy in general. For reasons of comparison panel a replicates
the main findings of Table 4. Panel b present the parameter estimates for the second
policy statement on coffeeshops: It should be permitted to sell cannabis at coffeeshops.
We obtain very similar results. Both current use of cannabis and past use of cannabis
have positive and significant effects on opinions. In panel b of column 2, similar to
column 2 of Table 4, the parameter estimate of current use is found to be twice as large
as the coefficient estimate of past use.11 This suggests that the magnitude of the effect
of self-interest is almost the same as that of inside information. For opinions on the
first and the second type of cannabis policy, there is a causal effect from past cannabis
use to opinions. Individuals that used cannabis in the past changed their opinion after
they had personal experience with cannabis toward amore liberal policy. They became
Footnote 10 Continued
of using cannabis. However, this is not the case for the population in the Netherlands where cannabis
market is regulated for both supply and demand. Also note that society as a whole is constantly learning
about negative effects or absence of negative effects of cannabis use through the accumulation of scientific
evidence and its public presentation. All individuals have potential access to public and private signals
about the self-harm effects of cannabis use. Own use (current or past) is not the only way to learn about this
margin, but the most effective indeed since it is first-hand information. Although all the other information
is available to all individuals, first-hand information is only available to cannabis users.
11 Note that for the second policy, we can identify a significant unobserved heterogeneity in the univariate
model although the estimated probability parameter is not well-identified. For this opinion, we can compare
univariate models with unobserved heterogeneity and the correlated models through likelihood ratio tests.
The results indicate that we fail to reject the correlated model against the univariate one. Therefore, there
is further evidence supporting the findings of the previous LR tests that correlation between unobserved
heterogeneity affecting opinions and cannabis use dynamics is significant.
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Table 5 Parameter estimates of
the effect of past and current
cannabis use on support for
various types of cannabis
policies
The numbers of observations are
2016, 2015, 2015, 2014, 2012
and 2005, respectively
The LR test 1 tests the univariate
model against the correlated
model. The likelihood ratio test
2 is for the joint significance of
cannabis use variables. The LR
test 3 is for equality of the
parameters of past cannabis use
and current cannabis use.
Absolute t-statistics in
parentheses
For opinions b & c, LR tests
indicate that unobserved
heterogeneity is significant in
opinions in the univariate
models although the distribution
is not well-identified. For these
two opinions we also compared
univariate models with
unobserved heterogeneity and
the correlated models through
likelihood ratio tests. The results
indicate that in both cases we
fail to reject the correlated
model against the univariate one,
which supports the findings of
the previous LR tests that
correlation between unobserved
heterogeneity affecting opinions
and cannabis use dynamics is
significant
* and ** are for statistical
significance at 10 and 5%,
respectively
Univariate (1) Correlated (2)
a. Cannabis legalized
Past cannabis use 0.97 (16.0)** 0.71 (5.7)**
Current cannabis use 1.60 (10.5)** 1.35 (7.8)**
LR Test 1 6.6**
LR Test 2 50.1**
LR Test 3 24.8**
b. Coffeeshops permitted
Past cannabis use 0.80 (13.1)** 0.47 (4.0)**
Current cannabis use 1.33 (10.7)** 1.05 (7.0)**
LR Test 1 11.8**
LR Test 2 44.0**
LR Test 3 21.1**
c. No sale to youngsters
Past cannabis use −0.54 (5.0)** −0.04 (0.3)
Current cannabis use −0.56 (2.3)** −0.06 (0.3)
LR Test 1 9.4**
LR Test 2 0.6
LR Test 3 0.4
d. No coffeeshops near schools
Past cannabis use −0.31 (4.9)** 0.01 (0.3)
Current cannabis use −0.67 (5.5)** −0.41 (2.5)**
LR Test 1 6.8**
LR Test 2 2.4
LR Test 3 12.0**
e. Education campaigns
Past cannabis use −0.13 (2.1)* −0.17 (1.6)
Current cannabis use −0.32 (2.6)** −0.35 (2.1)**
LR Test 1 0.2
LR Test 2 4.2
LR Test 3 2.1
f. Drugs education at schools
Past cannabis use −0.06 (1.0) −0.05 (0.3)
Current cannabis use −0.03 (0.2)** −0.01 (0.3)
LR Test 1 0.2
LR Test 2 0.2
LR Test 3 0.6
more likely to support no-prohibition andmore likely to support cannabis legalization.
This suggests that cannabis use is not as harmful as they originally thought.
Panels c–f of Table 1 give descriptive information about opinions on other drug
policy statements which are not directly related to availability of cannabis. For all
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these policies, the distribution of the responses is very skewed. Almost 90% of the
individuals agree with the statements that coffeeshops should not sell cannabis to peo-
ple below 18years old, the government should organize education campaigns against
drugs, there should not be coffeeshops in the vicinity of schools and the government
should ensure that schools organize education campaigns against drugs. The percent-
ages of those who agree with a specific cannabis policy remain high irrespective of
the user status. Nevertheless, to investigate whether there was a causal effect from
cannabis use to opinions, we performed a similar type of analysis as for the two main
policy statements that referred to cannabis prohibition and cannabis legalization. Since
the following policy statements are not directly about availability of cannabis, they
serve as falsification analysis on the self-interest aspect of cannabis use.
Panels c and d of Table5 present the parameter estimates of the effects of current and
past cannabis use on restrictions on sale of cannabis. Concerning no sale of cannabis
to youngsters, there is correlation with user status, but this disappears once correlated
unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. Apparently, individuals who started
using cannabis did not change their opinion on no sale of cannabis to youngsters. They
had a different opinion all along. They were less likely to support the idea of no sale
of cannabis to youngsters anyway. The findings for the statement that there should be
no coffeeshops near schools is somewhat different. In order to explore the possible
reason behind the significant negative parameter estimate, we performed the same
correlated analysis by dividing the current cannabis use variable into 3 parts: those
who frequently (more than once) used cannabis in the last 30days, those who used
cannabis only once in the last 30 days but started using cannabis at an earlier age and
those who for the first time used cannabis only once in the last 30days. Although not
reported here, the results after this distinction show that the negative effect is located
among those who used cannabis for the first time in the last 30days, which has a very
small number of observations. Once they are ignored, there is no effect. Moreover,
since these people cannot accumulate inside information from one time use and they
are mostly below 25years old, we argue that self-interest plays a small role.12
Panels e and f of Table 5 show the main parameter estimates for statements on
education programs. For education campaigns, there is no big difference between
the univariate model and the correlated model. This suggests that initially opinions
were not different but once some individuals started using cannabis they changed their
minds.Moreover, the fact that there is no difference between the effects of past use and
current use suggests that it is inside information that is driving the results. Apparently,
after personal experiencewith cannabis, some individuals were less inclined to support
education campaigns because they thought there was less need for such campaigns.
For drugs education at school, there is no difference in opinions according to user
status.
All in all, the findings for the specific types of drug policy show that cannabis use
did not have a big effect on opinions and if it did such as is the case for education
12 Making the same distinction in two main legalization policies whose results are given in Table4 did not
make any changes. This distinction seems to make a difference only for this specific policy statement on
the location of coffeeshops.
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campaigns, inside information is driving the results.13 As expected self-interest does
not play a significant role in shaping opinions about these policy statements.
5.3.2 Placebo tests
In order to investigate the robustness of our findingswe performed a range of sensitivity
checks of which we briefly report the results (see for details Palali and van Ours 2014).
First, by way of placebo analysis we investigate the effect of past and current cannabis
use on opinions about policies unrelated to cannabis use. The first placebo analysis
is on the opinions about alcohol legislation. We use information about opinions on
various types of alcohol policy all aiming at restricting access to alcohol. The proposed
policies are: no sale of alcohol in supermarkets, banning alcohol advertisements, no
sale of alcohol to youngsters under age 16, no happy hours in bars and discos, no
sale of alcohol in places which are frequently visited by youngsters. Using the same
correlated model approach, we find that opinions about these alcohol policies are not
different for cannabis users and non-cannabis users. The second placebo analysis is
on the opinions about government policies which are completely unrelated to risky
health behaviors. We use information about opinions on whether study grants should
be replaced by study loans and opinions on citizens’ influence on government policies.
Again there is no effect on these opinions of current or past cannabis use.
5.3.3 Sensitivity to model specifications
In a further set of robustness checks, we investigate the sensitivity of our baseline
results to various model specifications (see for details Palali and van Ours 2014).
We remove education dummies from starting rate analysis cannabis use may affect
educational attainment. We add political preference dummies in the starting rates.
Again, our conclusions remain the same. One issue with retrospective responses about
substance use is that there might be measurement errors due to recall bias. In order
to investigate if our results are sensitive to such a recall bias, we restrict our sample
to a much younger cohort as they are expected to recall more accurately. If we use
information on individuals who were born after 1969 we lose almost half of our
main sample but still obtain similar results. We also include several control variables
regarding different aspects of cannabis use. Adding variables for opinions about the
criminal aspect of cannabis use, peer use of cannabis and duration of cannabis use
does not affect our main conclusions. Moreover, using ordered logit models instead of
probit models yields the same results. As a final robustness analysis we estimate the
univariate and correlated models by reducing opinions variables to a three-point scale.
The parameter estimates are very similar as before. This indicates that our findings are
mainly driven by differences between individualswho agree or disagree to given policy
statements and not by differences between those who agree (disagree) or definitely
agree (definitely disagree).
13 The exception to these findings is the negative of current cannabis use on support for the ban of cof-
feeshops near schools. It is hard to imagine that this has a causal interpretation.
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Table 6 Simulations of the effects of past and current use of cannabis on opinions about cannabis legal-
ization and policy of cannabis shops (percentages)
Definitely disagree Disagree Indifferent Agree Definitely agree Total
a. Cannabis should be legalized
1. Current use 1 5 13 37 44 100
2. Past use 6 12 22 38 22 100
3. Never use 20 23 25 26 6 100
b. It should be permitted to sell cannabis at coffeeshops
1. Current use 4 7 15 53 21 100
2. Past use 12 14 21 44 9 100
3. Never use 23 19 22 32 4 100
The simulations are based on the parameter estimates of the correlated models presented in Table 4; the
reference person has sample mean values for all of the observable characteristics except for cannabis use
5.4 Magnitude of the effects
To indicate themagnitude of the effect of past and current use of cannabis,we simulated
the probabilities for each alternative in the ordered response variable. The simulation
results are given in Table6. The first panel presents the results for the first policy
statement (cannabis should be legalized). As shown there is a large effect of cannabis
use. The estimated probability of agreeing with legalizing cannabis is 33% for our
reference person who has never used cannabis (row (3)). If that reference person used
cannabis in the past, support for no-prohibition increases to 60% and if this person
is still using cannabis the support for no-prohibition jumps to 81%. Similarly, the
second panel presents the simulation results for the second policy statement. The
estimated probability of agreeing with the idea of selling cannabis at coffeeshops
is 36% for a never user reference person. This probability increases to 53% if this
reference person is a past-user and to 74% if the individual is a current user. Similarly
the probability of disagreeing decreases from 43 to 26 and 11%, respectively. A
comparison of these figures with the unconditional distribution given in Table 1 shows
that even though differences between cannabis users and non-users decrease after
controlling for observable and unobservable factors, they remain considerable.
6 Conclusions
Previous studies show that cannabis users are more in favor of cannabis legalization
than individuals who never used cannabis. Interesting as this may be in itself, it does
not necessarily imply that opinions are influenced by cannabis use in a causal way.
Individuals who are more likely to consume cannabis may also be more in favor of
legalization without the personal experience affecting opinions. Knowing whether or
not there is a causal effect from cannabis use is interesting because if so, it reveals how
potential dangers of cannabis use are assessed. If cannabis use increases the support
for legalizing cannabis, then this reveals that cannabis use may not be so harmful as
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individuals were inclined to think before they started using cannabis. However, such a
causal effect may also have to do with self-interest, i.e. the expectation that cannabis
legalization will induce easier access and perhaps lower prices.
We use data from a 2008 survey which includes detailed questions about cannabis
use and opinions about cannabis policies in the Netherlands. From our analysis, we
conclude that there is a causal effect of personal experience with cannabis use on the
support given to more liberal cannabis policies. Those who currently use cannabis
and those who used it in the past are more in favor of legalization. The opinion of
current cannabis users may be driven by self-interest and inside information but the
opinion of past users will be driven mainly by inside information about the dangers
of cannabis use. From the significance of the effect of past cannabis use, we conclude
that cannabis use may not be as harmful as cannabis users originally thought it was
and non-users are inclined to think. Our analysis suggests that as the share of cannabis
users in the population goes up support for cannabis legalization will increase.
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